Badllama 3: removing safety finetuning from Llama 3 in minutes
We show that extensive LLM safety fine-tuning is easily subverted when an attacker has access to model weights.
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We show that extensive LLM safety fine-tuning is easily subverted when an attacker has access to model weights. We evaluate three state-of-the-art fine-tuning methods-QLoRA, ReFT, and Ortho-and show how algorithmic advances enable constant jailbreaking performance with cuts in FLOPs and optimisation power. We strip safety fine-tuning from Llama 3 8B in one minute and Llama 3 70B in 30 minutes on a single GPU, and sketch ways to reduce this further.
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